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Abstract—Reliable positioning services are extremely impor-
tant for users and devices in mountainous environments as it
enables a variety of location-based applications. However, in
such environments, the service reliability of conventional wireless
positioning technologies is often disappointing. Frequent non-
line-of-sight (NLoS) propagation and poor geometry of available
anchor nodes are two significant challenges. Due to the high
maneuverability and flexible deployment of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), UAV-enabled positioning could be a promising
solution to these challenges. Compared with satellites and terres-
trial base stations, UAVs are capable of flying to places where
both the propagation conditions and geometry are favorable
for positioning. The eventual aim of this research project is
to design a novel UAV-enabled positioning system that uses a
low-altitude UAV platform to provide highly reliable services
for ground users in mountainous environments. In this article,
we introduce the recent progress made in the first phase of
our project, including the following. First, the structure of the
proposed system and the positioning method used are determined
after comprehensive consideration of various factors. Utilizing the
digital elevation model of the realistic terrain, we then establish
a geometry-based NLoS probability model so that the NLoS
propagation can be treated as a type of fault during the reliability
analysis. Most importantly, a reliability prediction method and
the corresponding metric are developed to evaluate the system’s
ability to provide reliable positioning services. At the end of this
article, we also propose a voting-based method for improving the
service reliability. Numerical results demonstrate the tremendous
potential of the proposed system in reliable positioning.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), UAV-enabled
positioning, reliability prediction, mountainous environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
MOTIVATED by the explosive growth of applicationsthat require or benefit from location information, po-
sitioning technologies are playing an increasingly important
role in our everyday lives [1]. Both the fifth generation (5G)
wireless network and the Narrowband Internet of Things (NB-
IoT) have considered positioning as an enabling technology
and essential service in 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) Release 16 and Release 14, respectively [2], [3].
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Fig. 1. Limitations of existing positioning technologies in mountainous
environments.
Mountainous environment is one of the typical deployment
scenarios of 5G and NB-IoT [4], [5], in which the positioning
service is also extremely important. Different from plain or
city environments, the terrain in mountainous environments
is complex and highly variable [6]. There may be several
completely different landforms like peaks, steep cliffs and deep
valleys within a small area, so that large position errors caused
by faults or anomalies may result in heavy economic losses or
even loss of life. Thus, the reliability of positioning services
should be a major concern for location-based applications
in mountainous environments, especially those life-critical
applications like field rescue and disaster management [7].
Thanks to the continuous development of consumer elec-
tronics industries over the past two decades, almost every
smartphone or wearable device today is equipped with a
global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver, which
could provide users with satisfactory positioning service in
some open-sky environments [8], [9]. Besides, since 3GPP
Release 9, terrestrial cellular networks have supported a variety
of cellular-based positioning technologies like the observed
time difference of arrival (OTDoA) positioning [10]. On
account of this, mobile phone users could use the cellular
network to locate themselves even in some GNSS degraded
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Fig. 2. Advantages of UAV-enabled positioning in mountainous environments.
environments like dense urban and indoors [11], [12]. How-
ever, there is a question that should be asked and seriously
considered: Are existing wireless positioning technologies,
including GNSS systems and the cellular-based positioning,
sufficient to ensure the reliability of positioning services in
mountainous environments? Unfortunately, the answer to this
question is no. As shown in Fig. 1, for the widely used
GNSS positioning technology, the weak signals are frequently
blocked by rugged terrain like peaks and ridges, resulting in
very limited availability and continuity of service [13], [14].
Moreover, the signal detected by the receiver may not be the
desired direct (LoS) signal from the satellite, but the signal
reflected from mountains [15]. This phenomenon, known as
NLoS propagation, will severely degrade the performance
of positioning service, causing errors of several meters to
hundreds of meters. Another challenge for GNSS users in
mountainous environments is the unfavorable geometry of the
satellites in-view [16]. For instance, the satellites available to
the user in a valley are mainly in the along-valley direction,
since the signals with line of sight going across the valley
are very likely to be blocked. This poor satellite geometry
leads to unsatisfactory accuracy and reliability in the across-
valley direction. Similar to GNSS positioning, cellular-based
positioning has the same limitations [17], including insufficient
number of available base stations (BSs), unfavorable geometry
of BSs, and the NLoS propagation phenomenon, making it
unsuitable for reliable positioning. To make matters worse,
since the elevation angles of terrestrial BSs are generally
much lower than those of GNSS satellites, cellular signals
experience more NLoS propagation than GNSS signals [18].
It is therefore unwise to expect cellular networks to perform
better than GNSS systems. Up to now, the implementation of
reliable positioning in mountainous environments remains an
open question.
With their high maneuverability and flexible deployment,
the UAV platform could be a promising solution to the afore-
mentioned challenges in mountainous environments. Utilizing
high-performance airborne navigation equipment like real-
time kinematic (RTK) receivers, UAVs have the ability to
precisely determine their own locations in real time, enabling
them to be employed as anchor nodes for positioning [19].
As shown in Fig. 2, compared with satellites operating in
fixed orbits or BSs fixed on the ground, UAV platforms have
their unique advantages. First, UAVs are capable of flying to
places where the channel conditions to users are good [20].
Therefore, through the optimization of the flight trajectory or
deployment strategy, UAV platforms can provide users with a
sufficient number of measurements, and effectively reduce the
probability of NLoS propagation. Moreover, if the geometry
of anchor nodes is also taken into account in the design of
the UAV trajectory [21], the problem of unfavorable geometry
common in GNSS and cellular-based positioning could be
largely avoided. From the above analysis, it can be concluded
that the UAV-enabled positioning system is a good choice
for providing reliable positioning services in mountainous
environments. Thus, the eventual aim of this research project
is to design such a system.
B. Related Work
UAV-enabled positioning that employs UAV platforms to
provide positioning services is not a new concept. In fact, some
studies pointed out more than a decade ago that UAVs and
many other types of platforms have the potential to be used
as mobile anchor nodes to determine users’ locations [22],
[23]. In the past few years, several prototypes of UAV-enabled
positioning system have been developed and tested in the
research community, such as HAWK (UMass Lowell) [24] and
GuideLoc (NWU, China) [25]. Most of these existing systems
adopt range-free localization approaches, which limits their
ability to provide accurate and reliable positioning services.
Moreover, their positioning performance is tested in some
ideal environments like sports field or campus, which cannot
effectively reflect the accuracy and reliability of positioning
services in practical applications. With the development of
airborne sensors, many recent studies began to use range-based
localization approaches, so as to make their systems suitable
for missions requiring high positioning accuracy. Sallouha et
al. [26], [27] proposed a system that uses UAVs and received
signal strength (RSS) technique to locate terrestrial nodes,
and analyzed the influences of UAV altitude and trajectory
on positioning performance. In [21], a UAV platform was em-
ployed to assist the terrestrial IoT network in energy-efficient
data collection and three-dimensional (3-D) TDoA positioning.
These two studies mainly focused on the improvement of
positioning accuracy, and used the Crame´r-Rao lower bound
(CRLB) to evaluate the system performance. The CRLB is a
useful evaluation metric for location estimation under fault-
free conditions as it defines a lower limit for the variance
of any unbiased estimator. However, the CRLB cannot reflect
the positioning accuracy and reliability under faulty conditions
where most location estimators are no longer unbiased. So far,
it seems that the service reliability in complex environments
has not become a research hotspot in the field of UAV-enabled
positioning.
Unlike UAV-enabled positioning, the GNSS community has
paid a great deal of attention to reliability issues. The detection
of service failures caused by faults or anomalies is one of
the most basic capabilities for reliable positioning systems. In
GNSSs, Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is
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a well-known technique used for detecting large position errors
[28]. Since the late 1980s, many different RAIM methods
have been developed and successfully applied in the aviation
domain, such as the least-squares-residuals (LS) method and
the solution separation (SS) method [28]–[30]. It should be
noted that these classic RAIM methods are based on the
single-fault assumption, which is not true for UAV-enabled
positioning in mountainous environments. First, there is no
doubt that the failure rates of low-cost airborne sensors are
much higher than those of GNSS satellites. Moreover, frequent
NLoS propagation also increases the probability of multiple
simultaneous faults. In [31], [32], the LS and SS RAIM were
extended to multiple-fault conditions. However, as one of the
major causes of service failures in mountainous environments,
the NLoS propagation was not considered in these studies
[33]. Thus, the RAIM technique used in GNSSs cannot be
transported directly into UAV-enabled positioning, but it still
provides valuable inspiration for the design of our reliable
positioning system.
C. Problems and Contributions
As mentioned above, our aim is to design a UAV-enabled
positioning system to provide reliable services in mountainous
environments. Specifically, we plan to achieve reliable posi-
tioning by solving the following problems.
1) Reliability prediction: prediction of the minimum po-
sition error that can be effectively detected during the
positioning process. If the predicted minimum detectable
error is less than or equal to the users maximum tolerable
error, then the UAV is allowed to take off and begin to
provide positioning services.
2) Reliability enhancement: adjustment of the UAV trajec-
tory or deployment strategy when the above condition is
not met. The objective of reliability enhancement is to
reduce the minimum detectable error below the tolerable
limit so that each service failure can be detected.
3) Reliability evaluation and maintenance: detection and
handling mechanisms for service failures occurring dur-
ing the positioning process. In the presence of service
failures, the system should be able to detect them and
mitigate their impacts on positioning service through
approaches like fault detection and exclusion (FDE), so
as to maintain the error within an acceptable range.
It can be foreseen that the study of the above three problems
would be a large research project requiring a lot of time and
effort. Thus, we decide to divide this project into multiple
phases and carry out them in turn. In the first phase which
has just been completed, the reliability prediction problem
have been fully studied and solved. In addition, we have also
conducted a preliminary study on reliability enhancement.
This article presents the progress we have made in the first
phase of our project. Specifically, the main contributions of
this article are summarized as follows.
• System design: the structure and operation scheme of
the proposed UAV-enabled positioning system is de-
termined. The users location is estimated from range
measurements obtained by a low-altitude UAV platform
at multiple “service points”. We choose the two-way
ranging based positioning as the positioning method used
in the proposed system and establish the corresponding
measurement error model.
• Modeling of service failures: in this article, we consider
two major causes of service failures in the proposed
system. One of them is called “internal faults”, which
includes various anomalies in airborne sensors or user
equipment, and the other is the well-known NLoS prop-
agation phenomenon. The impacts of these two types of
faults on positioning performance are theoretically ana-
lyzed and modeled. In particular, we develop a geometry-
based model for calculating the prior probability of NLoS
propagation, which is more conducive to reliable posi-
tioning than the conventional distance-based or elevation
angle based models.
• Proposal of a reliability prediction method: based on the
failure model mentioned above, we propose a reliability
prediction method and derive the corresponding metric.
This method takes account of the multiple-fault condi-
tions common in mountainous environments, making it
suitable for our system. The minimum detectable error
during the positioning process is derived and regarded
as the metric for evaluating reliability. The proposed
method enables the system operator to predict the service
reliability before the UAV takes off, thereby facilitating
decision-making.
• Preliminary study on reliability enhancement: it is found
in simulation that for a given set of service points, there
may be some “hazardous areas” in which the predicted
reliability does not meet the mission’s requirement. Thus,
we further study the problem of reliability enhancement.
We first use the 8-connected neighborhood to segment the
prediction result and extract hazardous areas. Then, we
propose a voting-based method to analyze the cause of
each hazardous area and provide guidance for adjusting
the location of service points. Numerical results show
that the proposed method is very helpful for improving
the service reliability.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to study
the service reliability of UAV-enabled positioning systems in
mountainous environments.
D. Organization and Notations
This article is organized as follows. The structure of the
proposed system and some basic models are given in Section
II. In Section III, the proposed reliability prediction method
and its corresponding metric are derived. Section IV introduces
our preliminary study on reliability enhancement. Section V
provides numerical results to demonstrate the tremendous
potential of our system and the effectiveness of the proposed
methods. Finally, Section VI concludes this article.
The main notations used in this article are summarized
as follows. Scalars are denoted by italic letters (a). Column
vectors and matrices are denoted by lowercase and uppercase
boldface letters (a and A), respectively. The superscript T
indicates the transpose operation (AT ) and superscript −1
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Fig. 3. Proposed UAV-enabled positioning system.
Radio transceiver
Navigation equipment
Flight computer
Positioning 
service
GNSS signals
Fig. 4. Main components of the UAV platform.
indicates matrix inverse (A−1). ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean
norm of a vector. I is the identity matrix. 〈·〉 denotes the
rounding operation.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this project, as shown in Fig. 3, we consider a scenario
consisting of a low-altitude UAV platform and multiple ground
users who scattered in a typical mountainous environment. The
users could be hikers or injured people who are trapped and
awaiting rescue, and our first priority is to determine their
locations. Each user has a barometer embedded in his/her
smartphone that could provide accurate altitude information.
However, in such an environment, users cannot use the GNSS
systems or cellular networks to obtain their horizontal loca-
tions due to the lack of service availability and reliability.
Therefore, we expect the UAV platform to undertake the task
of locating ground users. Fig. 4 shows the three main types
of payloads carried on the UAV platform: 1) the navigation
equipment used to determine the real-time precise location
of the UAV itself; 2) a radio transceiver for transmitting and
receiving positioning reference signal (PRS); and 3) a flight
computer for flight control and location estimation. These
payloads enable the UAV platform to be employed as an aerial
anchor node to provide positioning services for ground users.
The UAV platform flies at a fixed altitude hB . During the
mission, the UAV flies from the initial location to the final
location along a specific trajectory under control of the flight
computer. When passing through the area where a ground
user is located, the UAV will hover at multiple carefully
selected service points (SPs) and perform two-way ranging
(TWR). After all the SPs corresponding to the user have been
traversed, its location can be estimated from the obtained range
measurements utilizing multilateration algorithms.
Bh m
Uh
mind
UnR
Service Point
Sample Point of User Location
,
T
m m
m U Ux y   u
,
T
k k
k B Bx y   w
Fig. 5. Scenario of single user.
In this article, we mainly focus on the reliability prediction
and enhancement of the positioning service provided for each
user. Besides, we assume that ground users are far apart, so
that the UAV platform can only serve one user at each SP.
Thus, the overall scenario described above can be divided into
several single-user scenarios, as shown in Fig. 5. The precise
location of the user is unknown before the UAV provides
the positioning service. However, the location uncertainty
area where the user is located can be obtained in advance
based on historical information and motion prediction. The
boundary of the uncertainty area is indicated by the red
dotted line in Fig. 5, and its projection onto the horizontal
plane is a circle of radius RUn. For convenience, the location
uncertainty area is discretized into M sample points, denoted
by the set M ∆= {1, 2, · · · ,M}. The 3-D location of the
m-th sample point is denoted by the horizontal coordinate
um = (x
m
U , y
m
U )
T ∈ R2×1, m ∈ M, and the altitude hmU . In
addition, the prior probability that the user is located at each
sample point is assumed to be equal. For each ground user,
we set K SPs to provide positioning service, denoted by the
set K ∆= {1, 2, · · · ,K}. The horizontal coordinate of the k-th
SP is denoted by wk
∆
=
(
xkB , y
k
B
)T ∈ R2×1, k ∈ K. It should
be noted that there is a minimum distance requirement for the
setting of SPs. Specifically, the horizontal distance between
a SP and the center of the location uncertainty area should
be no less than dmin. The reason for this requirement is to
ensure that large position errors caused by faults or anomalies
will not bring significant changes to the geometry of SPs
relative to the user, so that the service reliability could be
evaluated or predicted without making assumptions on the
values or distributions of unknown faults. Obviously, reducing
the horizontal distance will increase the UAV elevation angle,
resulting in a smaller probability of signal blockage or NLoS
propagation. Thus, in this article, in order to ensure the
reliability of the positioning service, SPs will be set on a circle
of radius dmin, which is indicated by the black dotted line in
Fig. 5. Since the optimal location of SPs may be outside this
circle if other factors like energy consumption are considered
in future work, we retain the name dmin, and hope that it will
not cause inconvenience to the readers’ understanding.
The above paragraphs describe the structure, operation
scheme and application scenario of the proposed UAV-enabled
positioning system. In the following subsections, we provide
some technical details. We first introduce a geometry-based
probability model used to characterize the propagation con-
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6. Three types of propagation conditions in mountainous environments:
(a) LoS condition, (b) Blockage condition and (c) NLoS condition.
ditions in mountainous environments. Then, the TWR-based
positioning method and the corresponding measurement error
model are analyzed in detail. Finally, the probability model
of service failure that is essential for reliability prediction is
established.
A. Signal Propagation Model
As shown in Fig. 6, for air-to-ground (A2G) channels in
mountainous environments, there are three types of propaga-
tion conditions that need to be analyzed: 1) LoS condition
where a LoS radio path exists between the UAV and the
ground user; 2) Blockage condition where both the direct (LoS)
and reflected signals are blocked by surrounding terrain and
cannot be detected by the receiver; and 3) NLoS condition
where the direct signal is blocked and only reflected signals
are received. Among these three conditions, the LoS condition
is the most favorable one since it provides range measurement
with acceptable error. The occurrence of the blockage condi-
tion will reduce the number of available measurements and
thus affect the positioning performance, but it is not a direct
cause of service failures. The NLoS condition is always a
challenging problem for most range-based positioning systems
as it imposes significant bias in both ranging and positioning. It
should be noted that the multipath interference that frequently
occurs in mountainous environments is not considered in this
article, because we believe that existing techniques such as the
multipath estimating delay lock loop (MEDLL) are sufficient
to mitigate the impacts of multipath [34]. From the above
analysis, it can be concluded that these three propagation
conditions have completely different effects on positioning
services, requiring us to treat them differently. However, the
exact propagation condition of an A2G channel cannot be
fully determined before the wireless link is established. Thus,
what we really want to achieve in this subsection is the
determination of the prior probability of each condition.
Different from most existing research that employs distance-
based or elevation angle based LoS probability models to
characterize the A2G channel [35], [36], in this article, we
develop a geometry-based stochastic model based on the DEM
of the realistic terrain. Fig. 7 shows the terrain profile between
the k-th SP of the UAV platform and the m-th sample point of
user’s location, which is reconstructed using the DEM data.
The methods for reconstructing the terrain profile are described
in [37]. Assuming that the measurement error in DEM data
is negligible and DEM resolution is extremely high, the LoS
condition could be easily identified by checking whether all
DEM data points of terrain profile Model of terrain uncertainty
,min
m
kh
Fig. 7. Probability model of signal propagation condition.
DEM data points are below the UAV-user LoS (blue solid
line). Obviously, this assumption is unrealistic in practice.
To address this problem, we model the “terrain uncertainty”
caused by measurement error and limited resolution as an
additive white Gaussian noise nh (orange dotted line) added
to the minimum difference in height ∆hmk,min between DEM
data points and the UAV-user LoS.1 Then, the actual minimum
height difference with the consideration of location uncertainty
is given by
∆h˜mk,min = ∆h
m
k,min + nh, nh ∼ N
(
0, σ2h
)
, (1)
where σ2h denotes the variance of terrain uncertainty. The prior
probability of LoS condition is defined as the probability that
∆h˜mk,min is positive, which can be expressed as
Pmk,LoS=P
(
∆hmk,min+nh>0
)
=1−Fnh
(−∆hmk,min) , (2)
where Fx(t) = 1σx
√
2pi
∫ t
−∞ exp
(
− (x−µx)22σ2x
)
dx denotes the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variable
x, and µx is its mean value.
Contrary to the LoS condition, the prior probability that
the LoS path does not exist is Pmk,No LoS = 1 − Pmk,LoS . In
the absence of LoS path, two types of potential propagation
conditions still need to be distinguished, namely the blockage
condition and the NLoS condition. The basis for distinguishing
these two conditions is whether the received reflected signals
are strong enough to be detected by the receiver. In this article,
we employ the log-distance path loss model with log-normal
shadowing to calculate the strength and signal-to-noise (SNR)
ratio of the reflected signals. In the absence of LoS path, the
path loss between the k-th SP and the m-th sample point can
be written as
PLmk (dB) = β0 + 10αN log(l
m
k ) + ψN , (3)
where β0 = 20 log
(
4pifc
c
)
is the reference path loss at a
distance of 1m; fc and c are the main frequency of the
A2G channel and the speed of light, respectively; αN is the
path loss exponent (PLE) when the LoS path does not exist;
lmk =
√(
hB − hmU
)2 + ‖wk − um‖2 is the 3-D distance between
the SP and the sample point; ψN ∼N
(
0, σ2N
)
is a log-normal
variable representing the shadowing, and σ2N is its variance.
1Before calculating ∆hmk,min, those DEM data points within 20 meters of
the ground user are excluded in advance. The reason for doing this is to avoid
the unrealistic situation where the propagation condition is only determined
by the DEM data point closest to the user.
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In practice, the values of parameters αN and σ2N can be
set or changed flexibly according to the local environment.
As will be described in the next subsection, the proposed
system uses TWR-based positioning to locate the ground
user. The implementation of TWR requires the exchange of
messages between two devices [38], which means that both
the UAV platform and the user need to transmit and receive
PRS signal. In practical applications, the transceiver carried
by the UAV platform tends to have a larger transmit power
than user’s handheld device, which means that the signal
transmitted by the latter is more difficult to detect. Therefore,
the occurrence of NLoS condition depends directly on the
SNR of the reflected signals transmitted by the user device
and received at the UAV platform, which can be expressed as
SNRmk,U→B (dB) = Pt,U − PLmk − Pn0 , (4)
where Pt,U denotes the constant transmit power of user device
in dBm, and Pn0 is the noise power in dBm. The reflected
signals are considered to be detectable if the corresponding
SNR exceeds a threshold SNRmin, whose value is related to
the sensitivity of the airborne transceiver. It is worth noting
that although the distance between the SP and the sample point
is known, the detection of reflected signals is still a random
event due to the shadowing component ψN in (3). In addition,
we assume that the terrain uncertainty and the shadowing are
independent of each other. Thus, the prior probability of NLoS
condition is defined as the joint probability that the LoS path
does not exist and SNRmk,U→B exceeds SNRmin, which can
be expressed as
Pmk,NLoS=P
(
SNRmk,U→B>SNRmin, No LoS
)
=Pmk,No LoS ·P
(
SNRmk,U→B>SNRmin
∣∣No LoS)
=Pmk,No LoS ·P (ψN < ψmax)
=Pmk,No LoS ·FψN (ψmax) ,
(5)
where
ψmax = (Pt,U−Pn0−SNRmin)−(β0+10αN log (lmk )) . (6)
Moreover, the prior probability of blockage condition is
given by
Pmk,B = P
(
SNRmk,U→B≤SNRmin, No LoS
)
= Pmk,No LoS · (1− FψN (ψmax))
= 1− Pmk,LoS − Pmk,NLoS .
(7)
So far, the geometry-based probability model used in this
article to characterize A2G channels in mountainous envi-
ronments has been established. As long as the DEM of
the local environment is available, the prior probability of
each propagation condition corresponding to the A2G channel
between the k-th SP and m-th sample point can be obtained
utilizing equations (2), (5) and (7).
B. Model of TWR-Based Positioning
In the proposed system, TWR-based positioning is selected
to support the positioning service. Compared with the OTDoA
Bt
Ut
s
Bt
f
r
Ut
Ue D
s
Ut
Be
r
Bt
f l c 
(a) (b)
s
Bt B
B Uh h
ˆ
kl
Fig. 8. Model of TWR-based positioning: (a) Time diagram of TWR and its
(b) application example.
positioning widely used in terrestrial cellular networks, TWR-
based positioning eases the constraint of time synchronization
between anchor nodes, making it suitable for single-UAV
systems [39]. In TWR-based positioning, the time of flight
(ToF) τf is obtained through an exchange of messages between
the UAV platform and the ground user, as shown in Fig.
8(a). Specifically, the UAV platform first sends a ranging
request message to the user device at local time tsB . Since
the local clocks on both sides are not tightly synchronized in
advance, the user device has an unknown clock bias B with
respect to the UAV platform at the beginning of the session.
Moreover, the clock drift caused by the limited performance of
internal oscillator exists in both local clocks, which affects the
accuracy of the time interval measurement. The clock drifts of
the UAV platform and the user device relative to the perfect
clock are denoted by δB and δU , respectively. After τf = l/c
seconds of propagation, the request message arrives at the user
device and is detected at user’s local time trU , which can be
expressed as
trU = t
s
B +B + τf (1 + δU ) + eU , (8)
where eU is the time of arrival (ToA) measurement error
caused by the device’s internal noise.
After receiving the request message, the user device waits
for a fixed time τD according to its own local clock, and then
sends back a response message at local time
tsU = t
r
U + τD. (9)
Finally, the response message is detected by the UAV platform
at local time trB , which can be expressed as
trB = t
s
B + 2τf (1+δB) + (eU+τD) ·
(1+δB)
(1+δU )
+ eB . (10)
After receiving the response message, the UAV platform can
estimate the ToF according to its local clock, and the estimated
value τˆf is given by
τˆf =
1
2
[(trB − tsB)− (tsU − trU )]
= τf (1+δB) +
τD (δB−δU )+eU (1+δB)
2 (1+δU )
+
eB
2
.
(11)
The ToF estimation error can be expressed as
τˆf − τf = τfδB + τD (δB−δU )+eU (1+δB)
2 (1+δU )
+
eB
2
. (12)
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Note that the ToF is typically much smaller than the response
delay (τf  τD), because the latter includes not only the
turnaround time between the transmit and receive modes but
also the packet duration of several milliseconds [40]. Besides,
we assume that the airborne transceiver is equipped with a
high-performance oscillator. Thus, the clock drift of the UAV
platform is negligible relative to that of the user’s low-cost
device, that is, δB  δU  1. Then, the expression of ToF
estimation error can be rewritten as
τˆf − τf ≈ −τDδU
2
+
eU
2
+
eB
2
. (13)
Under normal conditions where the NLoS propagation phe-
nomenon and internal faults do not exist, the 3-D distance can
be obtained from the estimated ToF utilizing the relationship
lˆ= τˆf ·c. The corresponding ranging error can be expressed as
∆lˆ = c (τˆf − τf ) = nC + nU + nB , (14)
where nC = −(c · τDδU )/2 denotes the clock drift error;
nU = (c · eU )/2 and nB = (c · eB)/2 are ranging errors
caused by internal noise of the user device and the UAV
platform, respectively. Without loss of generality, we model
the clock drift error as a noise component, which follows a
zero-mean Gaussian distribution:
nC ∼ N
(
0, σ2C
)
, (15)
where σ2C denotes the variance of the clock drift error. If the
crystal tolerance of user’s oscillator OU is known, the value of
parameter σ2C can be determined using the following equation:
σ2C =
(c · τD
2
)2
·
(
OU
3
)2
=
(
c · τDOU
6
)2
. (16)
The other two terms on the right-hand side of equation (14)
are also Gaussian noise components, that is, nU ∼ N
(
0, σ2U
)
and nB ∼ N
(
0, σ2B
)
. In practice, the influence of devices’
internal noise on ranging performance is typically negligible
relative to the clock drift error [38], that is, σ2U  σ2C , σ2B 
σ2C . Therefore, the expression of range measurement noise for
TWR can be approximated as
∆lˆ = nC + nU + nB ≈ nC . (17)
From the above analysis, it can be seen that no matter
under which conditions, the range measurement noise of TWR
depends mainly on the user’s clock drift, whose variance
is known and remains constant during the mission. As will
be explained in the next section, this characteristic is very
important for the detection of service failures.
As shown in Fig. 8(b), after the UAV platform traverses
all SPs and performs TWR, the ground user’s location can be
estimated by solving the following equations:
lˆk =
√
(hB−hU )2 + ‖wk−u‖2 + nC , k ∈ K, (18)
where lˆk is the range measurement obtained at the k-th SP; u
and hU denote the user’s horizontal coordinate and altitude,
respectively. As mentioned at the beginning of this section,
each user device is equipped with a barometer. During the
TWR process, the accurate altitude measured by the barometer
would be contained in the response message and sent to the
UAV platform. Thus, only the horizontal coordinate u needs
to be estimated, that is to say, the localization problem studied
in this article is still a 2-D localization problem. In addition,
when predicting the service reliability, the altitude of each
sample point hmU is set as the sum of the corresponding DEM
data and the average height of handheld devices (1.5m).
C. Model of Service Failure
In the proposed system, the potential conditions in the range
measurement between the k-th SP and m-th sample point can
be divided into three categories: 1) blockage condition (B), 2)
failure condition (F) and 3) normal condition (N). As analyzed
in subsection A, the prior probability of blockage condition is
Pmk,B . On the contrary, the prior probability that the range
measurement can be obtained (O) is Pmk,O = 1 − Pmk,B .
In this article, the NLoS propagation and internal faults are
considered as the two major causes of service failures, and are
independent of each other. The prior probability of internal
fault PIF could be determined in advance based on the
reliability of the airborne transceiver and user device, and
will not change during the positioning process. Thus, the prior
probability of failure condition is given by
Pmk,F = P
m
k,LoSPIF + P
m
k,NLoS . (19)
The prior probability of normal condition where neither NLoS
propagation nor internal fault occurs can be expressed as
Pmk,N = P
m
k,Los · (1− PIF ) . (20)
Moreover, the conditional probabilities of failure and normal
conditions in the presence of range measurement are denoted
as Pmk,F|O=P
m
k,F
/
Pmk,O and P
m
k,N|O=P
m
k,N
/
Pmk,O, respectively.
The influence of NLoS propagation and internal faults on
TWR can be modeled as significant biases introduced in range
measurements. Thus, the expression of range measurement
under failure conditions can be written as
lˆk =
√
(hB−hU )2+‖wk−u‖2 + nC + bk, k ∈ K. (21)
It is worth noting that if the measurement bias bk is caused
only by NLoS propagation, its value is always positive.
Otherwise, the value of bk could be either positive or negative.
In practice, the absolute value of the bias bk is typically much
larger than that of the measurement noise nC . Although it is
possible that the positive bias of NLoS propagation and the
negative bias caused by internal faults cancel each other out
exactly, the probability of such events is extremely small and
will not be considered in the following.
III. RELIABILITY PREDICTION FOR UAV-ENABLED
POSITIONING
There are many mature techniques that can be used in
the proposed system to detect failures. Besides, during the
positioning process, the reliability (i.e., the minimum de-
tectable error) of failure detection could be evaluated in real
time utilizing the methods presented in existing research [31].
Thus, the focus of this section is not online fault detection
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or reliability evaluation, but the offline reliability prediction
before the UAV takes off. For the proposed system, once the
UAV is launched without adequate reliability prediction, the
reliability of failure detection and the accuracy of positioning
results are very likely to fail to meet the mission requirements,
resulting in a waste of time and resources (fuel or battery).
Therefore, it is necessary to perform reliability prediction
before the mission starts. However, compared with the online
reliability evaluation, the realization of the offline reliability
prediction is much more difficult. The major challenge is
that due to the uncertainty of user’s location and probabilistic
propagation condition, it is impossible to determine whether
the range measurement corresponding to a certain SP could
be obtained or not (i.e., the observation condition) before the
TWR is performed.
This section presents our proposed reliability prediction
method. The failure detection method used in this article is
introduced in subsection A. Then, in subsection B, we divide
all possible events in the positioning process into multiple
“observation events” and “failure events” according to the
visibility and status (normal or failure) of each SP, and the
prior probability of each event is derived. Finally, the reliability
of the positioning service is predicted based on the minimum
detectable error in each failure event.
In addition, we assume that the mission requires the pro-
posed system to detect failures that cause position error larger
than ηREQ in either x- or y-direction. The tolerable false
alarm (FA) rate and missed detection (MD) rate are denoted
by PREQFA and P
REQ
MD , respectively.
A. Failure Detection based on LS-Residuals
In this article, the least-squares-residuals (LS) method, a
well-known fault detection method originally developed for
GNSS applications [28], [31], is applied to the proposed
system to detect failures. We assume that during the mission,
the UAV platform can obtain range measurements at N SPs.
Then, the basic measurement equation used in LS method is
obtained through the linearization of equation (21), which can
be expressed as
l∗ = H∗u + n∗ + b∗, (22)
where l∗=
[
lˆ1,· · ·, lˆN
]T
is the N×1 measurement vector, and
lˆk represents the range measurement corresponding to the k-
th SP; u = [xU , yU]
T is the 2×1 state vector, representing
the unknown horizontal coordinate of the ground user; H∗ =[(
∂lˆ1
/
∂u
)T
,· · ·,
(
∂lˆN
/
∂u
)T]T
is the N × 2 Jacobian matrix
of ranging equations; n∗ is the N ×1 vector of zero-mean
Gaussian measurement noise due to the clock drift, and its
covariance matrix is denoted by V∗ = σ2C · IN ; b∗ is the
N×1 fault vector composed of measurement biases caused
by faults, and b∗ = 0N×1 under normal conditions. For the
sake of convenience, we normalize the above equation with
the covariance matrix V∗ [31]. The normalized measurement
equation is given by
l = Hu + n + b, (23)
LSt
Threshold T
Normal Condition Failure Condition
 LSf t
Missed Detection False Alarm
Fig. 9. Distributions of the test statistic.
where I = V−1/2∗ I∗, H = V
−1/2
∗ H∗, n = V
−1/2
∗ n∗ and b =
V
−1/2
∗ b∗. After normalization, the covariance matrix (V) of
the noise vector n becomes an N ×N identity matrix, that
is, n∼N (0N×1, IN ). Then, the least-squares solution of the
normalized equation can be expressed as
uˆ =
(
HTH
)−1
HT l = Gl. (24)
Specifically, the estimated x- and y-coordinates can be written
as [31]
xˆU = α
T
x uˆ = s
T
x l, (25)
yˆU = α
T
y uˆ = s
T
y l, (26)
where αx=[1, 0]
T , αy=[0, 1]
T , sTx =α
T
xG and s
T
y =α
T
y G.
The expression and distribution of the estimate error are
given by
ε = uˆ−u = G (Hu+n+b)−u = G (n+b) , (27)
εx=α
T
x ε=s
T
x (n + b) , εy=α
T
y ε=s
T
y (n + b) , (28)
εx∼
{ N (0, sTx sx) , Normal condition,
N (sTxb, sTx sx) , Failure condition. (29)
It can be clearly seen from the above equations that faults
do introduce a large bias in the positioning result, making
the location estimator no longer unbiased. To address this
problem, the LS method performs the failure detection based
on the differences (residuals) between the actual measured
ranges and the predicted ranges, which can be expressed as
lˆ = Huˆ = HGl, (30)
r = l− lˆ = (IN−HG) l = (IN−HG) (n+b) , (31)
where lˆ is the N × 1 vector of predicted ranges based on the
estimated location, and r is the residual vector. The squared
norm of the vector r is employed as the test statistic for failure
detection, which can be written as
tLS
∆
= ‖r‖2 = rT r. (32)
Under normal conditions, the test statistic tLS is the sum
of the squares of multiple Gaussian random variables, which
are obtained through a linear transformation of another set
of independent zero-mean Gaussian variables with the same
variance. Thus, tLS follows a chi-square distribution (green
solid line in Fig. 9) with N − 3 degrees of freedom (DOF).
On the contrary, tLS has a non-central chi-square distribution
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(red solid line) under failure conditions. The distributions of
test statistic tLS under normal and failure conditions can be
expressed as follows:
tLS∼
{
χ2(N−3) , Normal condition,
χ2
(
N−3,bT (I−HG)b) , Failure condition.
(33)
As shown in Fig. 9, if we set a decision threshold T for the
test statistic tLS , the failure detection can be realized with the
following decision rule:
If: tLS ≥ T , declare “service failure.”;
If: tLS < T , declare “service succeed.”.
B. Observation Events and Failure Events
Before the mission starts, the visibility of SPs is unknown.
In other words, we cannot be sure whether the UAV platform
can obtain the desired range measurement at a certain SP.
However, there is no doubt that the number and geometry
of available SPs will affect the reliability of failure detection.
Therefore, every possible observation event must be taken into
consideration when making reliability prediction, as shown in
Fig. 10.
Assume that the system has set K SPs for the UAV, then the
number of possible observation events is G = 2K . Among all
observation events, there are GSU =
(
K
2
)
+
(
K
1
)
+1 “service-
unavailable (SU)” events in which the available SPs are too
few to support positioning service. Moreover, in GPO=
(
K
3
)
“positioning-only (PO)” observation events, the number of
available SPs is just enough for positioning service but still
not enough for failure detection. Excluding the above two
types of events, the remaining GR = G − GSU − GPO
observation events in which the failure detection function can
be implemented are represented by the set
O = {o1,o2, · · · ,oGR} , (34)
where the subset
og =
{
ag1, · · · , agAg , u
g
1, · · · , ugUg
}
(35)
denotes the g-th observation event with Ag available SPs and
Ug unavailable SPs (Ag + Ug = K); a
g
i and u
g
j are the index
numbers of the i-th available SP and j-th unavailable SP in
observation event og , respectively. For the m-th sample point
of users location, the prior probability of the g-th observation
event is given by
Pmg =
Ag∏
i=1
Pmagi ,O
·
Ug∏
j=1
Pmugj ,B
, (36)
where the expressions of Pm
agi ,O
and Pm
ugj ,B
are derived in
Section II. Moreover, the conditional FA rate corresponding
to the g-th observation event can be expressed as
PmFA|og = P ( |εx|<η ∩ |εy|<η ∩ tLS≥Tg|og,b=0)
< P
(
tLS ≥ Tg|og,b = 0Ag×1
)
=
+∞∫
Tg
χ2t (Ag − 3, 0)dt,
(37)
where Tg is the decision threshold for failure detection in
observation event og .
As analyzed in Section II.C, each range measurement ob-
tained in the positioning process may be contaminated by
failure. As shown in Fig. 10, according to the status of each
SP, the observation event og can be further subdivided into one
normal event in which no failure occurs and Qg = 2Ag − 1
failure events. The prior probability of the normal event fg0 is
given by
Pmg,0 = P
m
g · Pm0|g = Pmg ·
Ag∏
i=1
Pmagi ,N |O. (38)
All potential failure events in the g-th observation event can
be represented by the set
Fg =
{
fg1 , f
g
2 , · · · , fgQg
}
, (39)
where the subset
fgq =
{
ng,q1 , · · · , ng,qNgq , f
g,q
1 , · · · , fg,qF gq
}
(40)
denotes the q-th failure event in observation event og , in which
there are Ngq normal SPs and F
g
q failure SPs (N
g
q +F
g
q = Ag);
ng,qi and f
g,q
j are the index numbers of the i-th normal SP and
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j-th failure SP in failure event fgq , respectively. For the m-th
sample point, the prior probability of the q-th failure event is
given by
Pmg,q = P
m
g ·Pmq|g = Pmg ·
Ngq∏
i=1
Pmng,qi ,N |O ·
F gq∏
j=1
Pmfg,qj , F |O, (41)
where the expressions of conditional probabilities Pm
ng,qi ,N |O
and Pm
fg,qj ,F |O can be found in Section II.C. It is noteworthy
that for any failure event, there is a certain probability that the
failure is not successfully detected, that is, the MD rate. The
conditional MD rate corresponding to failure event fgq can be
expressed as
PmMD|fgq = P
(
(|εx|≥η ∪ |εy|≥η) ∩ (tLS<Tg)| fgq
)
< P
( |εx| ≥ η ∩ tLS < Tg| fgq )
+ P
( |εy| ≥ η ∩ tLS < Tg| fgq ) . (42)
C. Reliability Prediction and the Corresponding Metric
The proposed reliability prediction method is summarized
in Algorithm 1. It can be seen that the implementation of
this method can be divided into four stages: “initialization”,
“event classification”, “requirement allocation” and “reliability
prediction”. The operations in the first two stages have been
introduced above. In this subsection, we mainly describe the
technical details of the remaining two stages.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, for the proposed
system, all possible events in the positioning process can be
divided into several observation events, each of which can
be further subdivided into multiple failure events. However,
the mission requirement only gives the tolerable limits of
overall FA and MD rates, and does not specify the tolerable
conditional FA/MD rate corresponding to each observation
event/failure event. As can be seen from equation (37), the
conditional FA rate of each observation event og mainly
depends on the value of the decision threshold Tg . From an-
other perspective, if the tolerable conditional FA rate PREQFA|og
is given, the feasible region of decision threshold can be
determined according to the constraint PmFA|og ≤ P
REQ
FA|og . In
practical applications, the decision threshold is typically set to
the value that just satisfies the constraint, that is,
+∞∫
Tg
χ2t (Ag − 3, 0)dt = PREQFA|og . (43)
It can be clearly seen from the above equation that the alloca-
tion of tolerable FA rate among observation events determines
the values of decision thresholds, thereby affecting the results
of reliability prediction. Thus, in this section, we first introduce
the FA rate allocation scheme (Algorithm 2) adopted in the
proposed reliability prediction method.
In the reliability prediction process, the overall FA rate
is defined as the sum of the conditional FA rates of all
possible observation events weighted by the prior probabilities
of corresponding normal events, that is,
PmFA
∆
=
GR∑
g=1
PmFA|og · Pmg,0 + PmFA,PO, (44)
Algorithm 1 Proposed Reliability Prediction Method
Input: DEM of realistic terrain, coordinate of each SP (wk,
hB), number of sample points M , coordinate of each
sample point (um, hmU ), tolerable FA rate P
REQ
FA and MD
rate PREQMD .
Initialization:
1: Utilize the DEM and the probability models introduced in
Section II to calculate the prior probabilities (Pmk,O, P
m
k,F|O
and Pmk,N|O) of potential statuses of each SP according to
parameters wk, hB , um and hmU ;
Event Classification:
2: Divide all possible events in positioning process into G
observation events according to the visibility of each SP,
and further subdivided each of them into one normal event
and Qg failure events according to SP’s status; (34), (39);
3: Calculate the prior probability of each observation event
(Pmg ), normal event (P
m
g,0) and failure event (P
m
g,q) based
on Pmk,O, P
m
k,F|O and P
m
k,N|O; (36), (38) and (41);
Requirement Allocation:
4: Allocate the overall tolerable FA rate PREQFA among ob-
servation events with the scheme described in Algorithm
2, and determine the threshold Tg in each event og;
5: Allocate the overall tolerable MD rate PREQMD among
failure events and both directions (x and y) with the
scheme described in Algorithm 3, conditional MD rate
PREQ,x
MD|fgq for the x-direction in event f
g
q ;
Reliability Prediction:
6: for m = 1 to M do
7: for g = 1 to GR do
8: for q = 1 to Qg do
9: Calculate the minimum detectable errors in x-
and y-directions (η∗m,xg,q and η
∗m,y
g,q ) based on Tg ,
PREQ,x
MD|fgq and P
REQ,y
MD|fgq ; (57)-(59);
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: Take η∗ = max
m∈M
{
max
g∈G
{
max
q∈Qg
{
η∗m,xg,q , η
∗m,y
g,q
}}}
as the
overall reliability prediction results; (60)-(63);
Output: η∗.
where PmFA,PO is the FA rate of GPO “positioning-only”
observation events. Once these events occur, the system will
sound an alarm. Thus, the MD rate of these observation events
is 0, and their FA rate can be approximated by their prior prob-
ability. In addition, for those service unavailable observation
events, their FA and MD rates are both 0. Then, according
to the mission requirement (PmFA ≤ PREQFA ) mentioned at the
beginning of this section, the allocation of tolerable FA rate
should satisfy the following constraint:
GR∑
g=1
PREQFA|og · Pmg,0 ≤ P
REQ
FA − PmFA,PO. (45)
When allocating the tolerable FA rate, we first sort the
observation events in ascending order of the prior probabilities
of corresponding normal events. The sorted observation events
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Algorithm 2 False Alarm (FA) Rate Allocation Scheme
Input: Number of observation events G, prior probability of
the normal event in each observation event (Pmg,0), overall
tolerable FA rate PREQFA .
Allocation:
1: Exclude GSU+GPO observation events in which failure
detection is unimplementable, and subtract their FA rates
PmFA,PO from overall tolerable FA rate P
REQ
FA ; (45);
2: Sort the remaining GR = G−GSU −GPO observation
events in ascending order of Pmg,0, and find the first g
∗−1
events with negligible FA rates, exclude them and subtract
their FA rates PREQFA,EXL from PFA−PmFA,PO; (46)-(49);
3: Allocate PFA−PmFA,PO−PREQFA,EXL to the remaining GR−
g∗+1 observation events according to Pmg,0; (50);
4: Determine the threshold Tg in each observation event og
based on the allocated conditional FA rate PREQFA|og ; (43);
Output: PREQFA|og and Tg .
and corresponding prior probabilities are, respectively, denoted
by sets
O¯ = {o¯1, o¯2, · · · , o¯GR} , (46)
P¯m0 =
{
P¯m1,0, P¯
m
2,0, . . . , P¯
m
GR,0
}
, (47)
and P¯mg−1,0 ≤ P¯mg,0 ≤ P¯mg+1,0. It is worth noting that since the
SPs are carefully selected, most of the observation events in
set O¯ are very unlikely to occur, that is to say, the FA rates
of these events are small and negligible. The index of the first
observation event that needs to be considered in the FA rate
allocation can be expressed as
g∗ = min
[
g|
g∑
i=1
P¯mi,0 ≥ PREQFA −PmFA,PO
]
. (48)
Then, the first g∗ − 1 observation events in set O¯ are ex-
cluded. Specifically, the tolerable conditional FA rates PREQFA|og
(1 ≤ g < g∗) of these observation events are set to 1,
whereas their conditional MD rates are 0. After excluding
these observation events, the constraint on FA rate allocation
among the remaining events can be written as
GR∑
g=g∗
PREQFA|o¯g ·P¯mg,0 ≤ P
REQ
FA −PmFA,PO−PREQFA,EXL, (49)
where PREQFA,EXL =
g∗−1∑
g=1
1·P¯mg,0 denotes the tolerable FA rate
of those excluded observation events. Finally, the remaining
tolerable FA rate (PREQFA −PmFA,PO −PREQFA,EXL) is allocated
according to the prior probabilities of the remaining normal
events, and the FA rate allocated to event o¯g (g∗ ≤ g ≤ GR)
is given by
PREQFA,o¯g = P
REQ
FA|o¯g · P¯mg,0
=
(
PREQFA −PmFA,PO−PREQFA,EXL
)
·P¯mg,0
GR∑
i=g∗
P¯mi,0
. (50)
Algorithm 3 Missed Detection (MD) Rate Allocation Scheme
Input: Number of failure events in each observation event
(Qg), prior probability of each observation event (Pmg )
and failure event (Pmg,q), overall tolerable MD rate P
REQ
MD .
Allocation:
1: Allocate PREQMD to the remaining GR−g∗+1 observation
events according to Pmg , P
REQ
MD,og
to event og; (52)-(53);
2: for g = g∗ to GR do
3: Sort the Qg failure events in observation event og in
ascending order of Pmg,q and find the first q
∗−1 events
with negligible MD rates, exclude them and subtract
their MD rates PREQMD,EXL,og from P
REQ
MD,og
; (54);
4: Allocate PREQMD,og−P
REQ
MD,EXL,og
to the remaining Qg−
q∗+1 failure events according to Pmg,q; (55);
5: Allocate the conditional MD rate PREQ
MD|fgq of failure
event fgq equally to the x- and y-directions, P
REQ,x
MD|fgq
to the x-direction; (56);
6: end for
Output: PREQ,x
MD|fgq and P
REQ,y
MD|fgq .
After the tolerable conditional FA rate of each observation
event (PREQFA|o¯g = P
REQ
FA,o¯g
/
P¯mg,0) is determined, the corre-
sponding decision threshold Tg can be obtained utilizing
equation (43).
It can be seen from equation (42) that once the decision
threshold is determined, the conditional MD rate of each
failure event fgq depends on the tolerable limit η of position
error. From another point of view, for a certain tolerable
conditional MD rate PREQ
MD|fgq , there exists a set of values of
parameter η that satisfy the constraint Pm
MD|fgq ≤ P
REQ
MD|fgq ,
which is called “detectable position error”. The minimum
detectable error (η∗) can effectively reflect the reliability of
failure detection, making it extremely important in reliability
prediction. In the following paragraphs, we introduce the MD
rate allocation scheme (Algorithm 3) adopted in the proposed
reliability prediction method.
According to the mission requirement (PmMD ≤ PREQMD ), the
allocation of tolerable MD rate should satisfy the following
constraint:
GR∑
g=1
PREQMD,o¯g =
GR∑
g=1
Q¯g∑
q=1
PREQ
MD|fgq ·P
m
g,q ≤ PREQMD , (51)
where the term
GR∑
g=1
PREQMD,o¯g means the allocation of tol-
erable MD rate among observation events, and the term
Q¯g∑
q=1
PREQ
MD|fgq ·Pmg,q represents the allocation among multiple
failure events in the same observation event. We first analyze
the former. As mentioned above, only the last GR − g∗ + 1
observation events in set O¯ need to be considered, while the
tolerable conditional MD rates of the other g∗ − 1 events are
set to 0. The MD rate allocated to event o¯g (g∗≤g≤GR) is
PREQMD,o¯g =
(
PREQMD · P¯mg,f
)/ GR∑
i=g∗
P¯mi,f , (52)
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where
P¯mg,f =
Q¯g∑
q=1
P¯mg,q = P¯
m
g − P¯mg,0 (53)
is the sum of the prior probabilities of all possible failure
events in observation event o¯g; P¯mg and P¯
m
g,q denote the prior
probabilities of observation event o¯g and the q-th failure event
in it, respectively.
Then, we further consider the MD rate allocation among
multiple failure events in the same observation event o¯g .
Similar to the operation in FA rate allocation, we first sort the
Q¯g failure events according to their prior probabilities, and
then exclude those events with negligible prior probabilities.
Let F¯g =
{
f¯g1 , f¯
g
2 , · · · , f¯gQ¯g
}
be the set of sorted failure events,
and q∗ be the index of the first failure event that needs to be
considered. The constraint on MD rate allocation among the
remaining Q¯g − q∗ + 1 events can be written as
Q¯g∑
q=q∗
PREQ
MD|¯fgq ·P¯
m
g,q ≤ PREQMD,o¯g−P
REQ
MD,EXL,o¯g
, (54)
where PREQMD,EXL,o¯g =
q∗−1∑
q=1
1·P¯mg,q denotes the tolerable MD
rate of those excluded failure events. Finally, the remaining
tolerable MD rate (PREQMD,o¯g −P
REQ
MD,EXL,o¯g
) is allocated to
each failure event f¯gq (q
∗ ≤ q ≤ Q¯g) according to its prior
probability:
PREQ
MD,¯fgq
= PREQ
MD|¯fgq · P¯
m
g,q
=
(
PREQMD,o¯g − P
REQ
MD,EXL,o¯g
)
· P¯mg,q
Q¯g∑
j=q∗
P¯mg,j
. (55)
In addition, in equation (42), the conditional MD rate
Pm
MD|fgq is upper-bounded by the sum of the conditional MD
rates in x- and y-directions. In the rest of this subsection, we
will analyze the reliability of failure detection in x- and y-
directions separately, and determine the minimum detectable
error in each direction. Thus, the tolerable conditional MD
rate (PREQ
MD|¯fgq ) of failure event f¯
g
q is further equally allocated
to the two directions, that is,
PREQ,x
MD|¯fgq = P
REQ,y
MD|¯fgq = P
REQ
MD|¯fgq
/
2, (56)
where PREQ,x
MD|¯fgq and P
REQ,y
MD|¯fgq denote the conditional MD rates
allocated to the x- and y-directions, respectively.
In the proposed system, the minimum detectable position
error in all possible failure events and both directions is taken
as the metric for reliability prediction. We first take the failure
detection in x-direction as an example to analyze the minimum
detectable error in failure event f¯gq . The key to determining the
minimum detectable error is to find the worst fault vector that
maximizes the position error while satisfying the constraint of
tolerable conditional MD rate, that is,
max
bgq
|εx| (57)
s.t. P
(
tLS<Tg|bm,xg,q
) ≤ PREQ,x
MD|¯fgq ,
where bm,xg,q denotes the fault vector in failure event f¯
g
q .
Noted that in the above equation, the conditional MD
rate P
( |εx| ≥ η ∩ tLS < Tg|bm,xg,q ) is replaced by the term
P
(
tLS < Tg|bm,xg,q
)
since P
( |εx| ≥ η ∩ tLS < Tg|bm,xg,q ) ≤
P
(
tLS < Tg|bm,xg,q
)
. As mentioned in [41], the worst fault
vector is also the one with the largest “failure slope (s)”. The
slope s is defined as the ratio of the squared mean of the
position error εx over the non-centrality parameter of the test
statistic tLS , and can be written as
s
∆
=
bT sxs
T
xb
bT (I−HG) b . (58)
The methods for calculating the worst fault vector and the
corresponding slope were described in [31] and will not be
repeated here. Let b∗m,xg,q be the worst fault vector, and s
∗m,x
g,q
be the largest failure slope. Then, the minimum detectable
error in the x-direction in event f¯gq is defined as the estimate
bias cause by the worst fault vector, and can be expressed as
η∗m,xg,q
∆
=
√
s∗m,xg,q ·
(
b∗m,xg,q
)T
(I−HgGg)
(
b∗m,xg,q
)
, (59)
where Hg is the Jacobian matrix of the normalized ranging
equations in observation event o¯g , and Gg =
(
HTg Hg
)−1
HTg .
With the above operations, we can also determine the mini-
mum detectable error η∗m,yg,q in the y-direction.
For the m-th sample point of user’s location, its correspond-
ing reliability prediction result is defined as the largest of the
minimum detectable errors in all possible failure events, which
can be expressed as
η∗m= max
g∈G
{
max
q∈Q¯g
{
η∗m,xg,q , η
∗m,y
g,q
}}
, (60)
where G = {g∗, · · · , GR}, and Q¯g =
{
q∗, · · · , Q¯g
}
. The
prediction results in x- and y-directions can be written as
η∗m,x = max
g∈G
{
max
q∈Q¯g
{
η∗m,xg,q
}}
, (61)
η∗m,y = max
g∈G
{
max
q∈Q¯g
{
η∗m,yg,q
}}
. (62)
Moreover, as mentioned at the beginning of Section II, the
uncertainty area of user’s location contains M sample points,
and the prior probability of the user being located at each
sample point is equal. Thus, the worst predicted reliability in
all sample points is taken as the prediction result of service
reliability, that is
η∗ = max
m∈M
{η∗m} = max
m∈M
{η∗m,x, η∗m,y} . (63)
With the proposed reliability prediction method and the
derived metric, system operators and mission commanders
are capable of evaluating the reliability of positioning service
before the mission starts, which is beneficial for decision-
making. If the predicted detectable position error η∗ does
not exceed the mission’s tolerable limit ηREQ, the UAV is
permitted to take off and provide service, because we are pretty
sure that those failures that cause unacceptable position errors
will be successfully detected in the positioning process and
will not mislead decision-makers.
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Fig. 11. Example of reliability prediction: (a) 3-D view and (b) top view of
the test scenario, and (c) the corresponding prediction results (η∗m).
IV. PRELIMINARY STUDY ON RELIABILITY
ENHANCEMENT
In mountainous environments with complex and highly
variable terrain, the mission’s requirements for service reli-
ability are often difficult to meet, even for a set of carefully
selected SPs. Fig. 11 shows the reliability prediction results
obtained in a test scenario, where the tolerable limit of position
error (ηREQ) is set to 20m. It can be clearly seen that in
the location uncertainty area, there are many sample points
whose predicted detectable errors exceed ηREQ. If the user
happens to be located at one of these sample points, failures
that cause position errors larger than ηREQ may not be
effectively detected during the positioning process, making
the positioning result unreliable. Therefore, it is necessary
to improve the reliability prediction results by appropriately
adjusting the locations of some SPs, that is, the reliability
enhancement.
The following two subsections introduce our preliminary
study on reliability enhancement. In subsection A, we describe
the data preprocessing procedures performed at the beginning
of reliability enhancement. Subsection B presents our proposed
voting-based method, which can be used to analyze the causes
of unsatisfactory reliability and provide guidance for the
adjustment of SPs.
A. Identification and Segmentation of Hazardous Areas
As can be seen from Fig. 11(c), sample points with unsatis-
factory reliability are spatially clustered into two small blocks,
which are called “hazardous areas” in this article. The aim of
reliability enhancement is to analyze the causes of these areas
and eliminate them based on the analysis results. Obviously,
different hazardous areas may have different causes. Therefore,
the identification and segmentation of hazardous areas are
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Fig. 12. Hazardous areas (a) identification and (b) segmentation.
two essential data preprocessing procedures for reliability
enhancement.
In this article, the identification of hazardous areas is
realized by comparing the reliability prediction result (η∗m)
of each sample point m with a predetermined threshold ηT .
The decision rule can be expressed as
m ∈
{
MH , if η∗m > ηT ,
M0, otherwise,
(64)
whereMH andM0 are sets composed of sample points inside
and outside the hazardous areas, respectively. It is worth noting
that the threshold ηT is usually set to be slightly smaller
than ηREQ, that is, ηT < ηREQ. The reason for this is to
provide a margin against the reliability degradation outside the
hazardous areas caused by the adjustment of SPs’ locations.
Fig. 12(a) shows the result of hazardous area identification.
After finishing the identification process, we consider how
to determine which area a sample point belongs to, that is, the
segmentation of hazardous area. In this article, the well-known
8-connected neighborhood approach is used to determine the
boundary of each hazardous area and segment sample points.
The segmentation results are shown in Fig. 12(b).
B. Proposed Voting-based Cause Analysis Method for Relia-
bility Enhancement
Intuitively speaking, the major cause of hazardous areas in
the test scenario is that the mountain surrounded by yellow
circle in Fig. 11(b) reduces the visibility of several SPs and
increases the probability of NLoS propagation. However, this
kind of intuitive analysis is not sufficient to provide guidance
for the adjustment of SPs’ locations and is not suitable for
complex terrain environments. In order to achieve the goal of
eliminating hazardous areas in the reliability prediction results,
it is extremely important to find out the specific cause of each
hazardous area. Specifically, we need to know which SPs’ low
visibility or high failure rates lead to the existence of a certain
hazardous area.
It is worth noting that even the cause analysis of a single
hazardous area is not easy to implement. For example, haz-
ardous area 1 in Fig. 11(c) covers a large area and contains a
number of sample points. The reasons for the unsatisfactory
reliability of these sample points are very unlikely to be
the same. However, it is obviously impossible to adjust SPs’
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Algorithm 4 Voting-based Method for the Cause Analysis of
Hazardous Area i
Input: The set Mi composed of sample points in i-th
hazardous area, reliability prediction results (η∗mi,x and
η∗mi,y) corresponding to each sample point mi (mi ∈
Mi).
Initialization:
1: Initialize voting vectors: v∗xHi,U ← 01×K , v∗xHi, F |O ←
01×K , v
∗y
Hi,U
←01×K , v∗yHi, F |O←01×K ;
Voting Process:
2: for mi = 1 to Mi do
3: Calculate the prior probabilities Pmik,B and P
mi
k,F|O;
4: Find the largest number of unavailable SPs in the
remaining observation events: U¯∗mi = max
g∈Gmi
{
U¯g
}
;
5: Find the largest number of failure SPs in the remaining
failure events: F¯ ∗mi = max
g∈Gmi
{
max
q∈Q¯mig
{
F¯ gq
}}
;
6: if η∗mi,x>ηT then
7: for k = 1 to K do
8: if Pmik,B is the largest U¯
∗mi among K SPs then
9: v∗xHi,U [k]←v∗xHi,U [k]+ (η
∗mi,x−ηT )2∑
mi∈Mi
(η∗mi,x−ηT )2 ;
10: end if
11: if Pmik,F|O is the largest F¯
∗mi among K SPs then
12: v∗xHi, F |O [k]←v∗xHi, F |O [k]+
(η∗mi,x−ηT )2∑
mi∈Mi
(η∗mi,x−ηT )2 ;
13: end if
14: end for
15: end if
16: Repeat steps 6-15 in the y-direction;
17: end for
18: v∗xHi,U ←
〈
v∗xHi,U
〉
, v∗xHi, F |O ←
〈
v∗xHi, F |O
〉
, v∗yHi,U ←〈
v∗yHi,U
〉
, v∗yHi, F |O←
〈
v∗yHi, F |O
〉
;
Output: v∗xHi,U , v
∗x
Hi, F |O, v
∗y
Hi, F |O and v
∗y
Hi, F |O.
locations according to the requirements of each sample point.
To address this problem, we propose a voting-based cause
analysis method, which can fuse the causes of all sample
points inside a hazardous area into a final cause analysis result
corresponding to the whole area. The proposed method is
summarized in Algorithm 4. The key idea of this method is to
let each sample point vote for the SPs that have the greatest
impacts on its reliability, and the SPs with weighted votes more
than a threshold value (0.5) will be regarded as the cause of
the hazardous area. As can be seen from Algorithm 4, there are
four types of voting vectors in the proposed method, namely,
v∗xHi,U , v
∗y
Hi,U
, v∗xHi, F |O and v
∗y
Hi, F |O. v
∗x
Hi,U
[k] = 1 means
that the low visibility of the k-th SP is one of the reasons
for the i-th hazardous area’s unsatisfactory reliability in x-
direction. v∗xHi, F |O [k] = 1 indicates that the high conditional
failure rate of the k-th SP leads to the poor reliability of the
i-th hazardous area in x-direction. v∗yHi,U and v
∗y
Hi, F |O have
similar meanings to v∗xHi,U and v
∗x
Hi, F |O, respectively. Table
I shows the voting results corresponding to the test scenario.
Note that the voting vectors in Table I have been binarized in
TABLE I
VOTING RESULTS IN THE CAUSE ANALYSIS OF HAZARDOUS AREAS
SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 SP6 SP7 SP8
v∗xH1,U 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
v∗x
H1, F |O 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
v∗yH1,U 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
v∗x
H1, F |O 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
v∗xH2,U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
v∗x
H2, F |O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
v∗yH2,U 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
v∗x
H2, F |O 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
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Fig. 13. Example of reliability enhancement: (a) Guidance for SP location
adjustment, (b) adjusted SPs, and (c) the enhancement results (η∗m).
the last step of Algorithm 4. It can be concluded that the low
visibility of SPs 3, 4 and 5 is the major cause of hazardous
area 1. The low visibility of SPs 6, 7 and the high conditional
failure rate of SP 5 lead to the poor reliability of hazardous
area 2.
The cause analysis results obtained by the proposed method
provide helpful guidance for the adjustment of SPs locations.
For hazardous area 1, its reliability is limited by the visibility
of SPs 3 and 4. Thus, in order to improve the visibility of
these two SPs in hazardous area 1, we rotate them clockwise
around the center of the location uncertain area by appropriate
angles, as shown in Fig. 13(a). Similarly, we rotate SPs 6 and
7 counterclockwise to improve their visibility in hazardous
area 2. Since SP 5 affects the reliability of both areas,
the adjustment of its location is the most complicated. To
make matter worse, the two hazardous areas have conflicting
requirements for the adjustment of SP 5. For example, rotating
SP 5 clockwise could reduce its conditional failure rate in
hazardous area 1, but at the same time further degrade its
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visibility in hazardous area 2. It is noteworthy that the cause
analysis results shown in Table I can also help us solve this
problem. It can be seen from Table I, SP 5 has good visibility
but high conditional failure rate in hazardous area 2. For this
type of SPs, in addition to reducing its conditional failure rate,
greatly reducing its visibility to make it almost unavailable
is also a potential way to reduce its impact on reliability.
Therefore, we rotate SP 5 counterclockwise to improve and
reduce its visibility in hazardous area 1 and 2, respectively. The
adjusted SP locations and the enhanced reliability prediction
results are shown in Fig. 13(b) and (c), respectively.
As can be seen from Fig. 13(c), the enhanced reliability
meets the mission’s requirement (η∗m < ηREQ = 20m),
which demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed voting-
based method. Currently, the proposed method only provides
guidance for SP adjustment, while the exact locations of
adjusted SPs are manually selected according to the guidance.
In our future work, we will try to develop a novel reliability
enhancement method that could perform SP adjustment auto-
matically.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, a series of simulation experiments are con-
ducted and the corresponding numerical results are provided
to verify the feasibility of the proposed system, as well as
the validity and performance of the proposed methods. As
shown in Fig. 14, we selected three test scenarios from a
typical mountainous environment. Among them, scenario 3
has been used in the previous section, and the remaining two
scenarios will be used for experiments in this section. First,
we test the service reliability of the proposed UAV-enabled
positioning system in scenario 1 with the proposed reliability
prediction method, and analyze the key factors affecting relia-
bility. Then, the effectiveness of the proposed voting-based
method for reliability enhancement is demonstrated via an
experiment conducted in scenario 2. Table II summarizes the
key simulation parameters used in this section.
A. Reliability Test of the Proposed System
Utilizing the proposed reliability prediction method de-
scribed in Section III, we test the service reliability of the
proposed system in the test scenario shown in Fig. 15(a),
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Main frequency (fc) 1.5 GHz
Path loss exponent (PLE) in NLoS (αN ) 3.4
Standard deviation of shadowing (σN ) 1.4 dB
Transmission power of user device (Pt,U ) 20 dBm
Noise power (Pn0 ) -104 dBm
Standard deviation of terrain uncertainty (σh) 1 m
Radius of location uncertainty area (RUn) 200 m
Number of sample points (M ) 1257 (interval 10m)
Number of service points (SPs) (K) 8
UAV altitude (hB) 100 m
Minimum horizontal distance between SP and
the center of location uncertainty area (dmin)
400 m
Response delay of TWR (τD) 5 ms
Crystal tolerance of user’s oscillator (OU ) 10 ppm
Prior probability of internal fault (PIF ) 10−6
Tolerable limit of position error (ηREQ) 20 m
Tolerable FA rate (PREQFA ) 10
−4
Tolerable MD rate (PREQMD ) 10
−6
Threshold for hazardous areas (ηT ) 18 m
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Fig. 15. Reliability prediction in scenario 1: (a) Top view of test scenario 1
and (b) the corresponding prediction results (η∗m).
where a user is located in a valley surrounded by moun-
tains. This scenario is considered to be very challenging
for conventional GNSS systems or terrestrial cellular-based
positioning technologies, because their signals are very likely
to be blocked by terrain. The reliability prediction results are
shown in Fig. 15(b). It can be seen that in such a challenging
environment, the predicted minimum detectable position error
of the proposed system is 16.8m, which meets the mission’s
requirement for service reliability (ηREQ = 20m). In fact,
such performance is sufficient to support many life-critical
missions like field rescue and disaster management. Therefore,
it can be concluded that the proposed system has the potential
to provide highly reliable positioning service for ground users
in mountainous environments.
We further analyze the key factors affecting the reliability
of the proposed system. Obviously, the altitude of the UAV
platform affects the reliability. The red line in Fig. 16 shows
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Fig. 16. Analysis of key factors affecting reliability.
the variation of the predicted reliability with the UAV altitude.
It can be seen that the reliability improves as the altitude
increases. This phenomenon is quite easy to understand since
the increase in altitude leads to better visibility as well
as a smaller NLoS probability, which ultimately results in
better reliability. However, it should be noted that in practical
applications, UAV altitude is restricted by air traffic control
and safety considerations, which means that we should not
always try to improve the reliability by increasing the altitude.
Moreover, we also study the influence of SPs’ locations
on reliability. In the experiment, we change the locations of
SPs by rotating all of them counterclockwise at the same
time. The bar chart in Fig. 16 shows the reliability prediction
results obtained at different rotation angles. It can be seen that
with the increase of rotation angle, the predicted minimum
detectable error first increases and then decreases, ranging
from 16.8m to 27.1m. The reliability corresponding to the best
rotation angle (5◦) has a 38% improvement compared with that
corresponding to the worst rotation angle (20◦). The above
phenomenon indicates that the selection of SPs’ locations
is also one of the main factors that affect the proposed
system’s reliability. In addition, optimizing the locations of
SPs could improve the service reliability without changing
the UAV altitude, which is an important basis for reliability
enhancement.
B. Demonstration of the Proposed Enhancement Method
The proposed voting-based cause analysis method for re-
liability enhancement has been tested in Section IV. In this
subsection, we test it again in scenario 2 to demonstrate its
effectiveness in different scenarios. The test scenario and its
corresponding reliability prediction results are shown in Fig.
17(a) and (b), respectively. It can be seen that there is a
hazardous area in Fig. 17(b). Then, we use the proposed
method to analyze the cause of this hazardous area, and the
analysis results are shown in Table III. The analysis results
indicate that the low visibility of SPs 2, 3 and the high
conditional failure rate of SP 1 lead to the unsatisfactory
reliability of the hazardous area.
Based on the cause analysis results obtained by the proposed
method, we adjust the locations of SPs as follows. In order
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Fig. 17. Reliability prediction and enhancement in scenario 2: (a) Top view
of test scenario 2 and (b) the prediction results (η∗m), (c) adjusted SPs and
(d) the enhancement results (η∗m).
TABLE III
CAUSE ANALYSIS RESULTS IN TEST SCENARIO 2
SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 SP6 SP7 SP8
v∗xH1,U 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
v∗x
H1, F |O 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
v∗yH1,U 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
v∗x
H1, F |O 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
to improve the visibility of SPs 2 and 3, we rotate them
counterclockwise by appropriate angles so that their signals
are less likely to be blocked by mountains. Then, we rotate
SP 1 clockwise to reduce its NLoS probability. The adjusted
SP locations and the corresponding enhanced reliability are
shown in Fig. 17(c) and (d), respectively. It can be seen
that the enhanced reliability meets the mission’s requirement,
which demonstrates that the proposed method is effective for
reliability enhancement in mountainous environments.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article presents the progress made in the first phase
of our research project on reliable UAV-enabled positioning,
which aims to develop a novel system that uses a low-altitude
UAV platform to provide highly reliable positioning services
in mountainous environments. In this phase, we solved the
reliability prediction problem in our UAV-enabled positioning
system, and conducted a preliminary study on reliability
enhancement. We first designed the structure and operation
scheme of the system, and selected the appropriate method to
support positioning service. Then, the major causes of service
failures were theoretically analyzed, and a failure model was
established to describe their prior probabilities and impacts
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 17
on positioning performance. Based on the established failure
model, we propose a reliability prediction method to evaluate
the reliability of the positioning service before the UAV
takes off. Moreover, for those situations where the predicted
reliability fails to meet the requirements, we also proposed a
voting-based method to analysis the causes of unsatisfactory
reliability and provide guidance for reliability enhancement.
Numerical results demonstrated the tremendous potential of
our system in reliable positioning, as well as the effectiveness
of the proposed methods. We hope that this article would bring
inspiration for the application of UAVs in future networks and
lead to a new practical solution for reliable positioning service.
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